Should US air strikes be used to stop Iran's nuclear programme?

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser

There are compelling reasons against a preventive air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

First, in the absence of an imminent threat (and the Iranians are at least several years away from having a nuclear arsenal), the attack would be a unilateral act of war. If undertaken without a formal congressional declaration of war, an attack would be unconstitutional and merit the impeachment of the president. Similarly, if undertaken without the sanction of the United Nations Security Council, either alone by the United States or in complicity with Israel, it would stamp the perpetrator(s) as (an) international outlaw(s).

Second, likely Iranian reactions would significantly compound ongoing US difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps precipitate new violence by Hezbollah in Lebanon and possibly elsewhere, and in all probability bog down the US in regional violence for a decade or more. Iran is a country of about 70 million people, and a conflict with it would make the misadventure in Iraq look trivial.

Third, oil prices would climb steeply, especially if the Iranians were to cut their production or seek to disrupt the flow of oil from the nearby Saudi oilfields. The world economy would be severely affected, and the United States would be blamed for it.

In short, an attack on Iran would be an act of political folly, setting in motion a progressive upheaval in world affairs.

That certainly is the lesson taught by our experiences in Vietnam and Iraq.

YES

Louis Rene Beres, professor of political science in the US

Further diplomacy has no chance of stopping Iran's nuclear programme. Neither will UN sanctions have any effect. Unless there is a timely defensive first strike at pertinent elements of Iran's expanding nuclear infrastructures, it will acquire nuclear weapons. The consequences would be intolerable and unprecedented.

A nuclear Iran would not resemble any other nuclear power. There could be no stable "balance of terror" involving that Islamic republic. Unlike nuclear threats of the Cold War, which were governed by mutual assumptions of rationality and mutual assured destruction, a world with a nuclear-armed Iran could explode at any moment. Although it might still seemreasonable to suggest a postponement of pre-emption until Iran were more openly nuclear, the collateral costs of any such delay could be unendurable. Ideally, a diplomatic settlement with Iran could be taken seriously. But in the real world, we must compare the price of prompt pre-emptive action against Iran with the costs of both inaction and delayed military action. To be sure, all available options are apt to be injurious.

The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, maintains that his country's nuclear programme is intended only to produce electricity, but there is no plausible argument or evidence to support this claim. Meanwhile, Mr Ahmadinejad's genocidal intentions towards Israel are abundantly clear.

Iran must be stopped immediately from acquiring atomic arms. Precise defensive attacks against Iran's nuclear assets would be effective – and they would be entirely legal.